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Tuesday, December 17, 2013

DEVOUT JAPANESE BUDDHIST: GENERAL MATSUI IWANE (27 JULY 1878 TO 23 DECEMBER 1948)




            On this date, 17 December 1937, General Matsui Iwane and Prince Asaka Yasuhiko marched triumphantly into the city of Nanking. I will post information about General Matsui Iwane from Wikipedia and other links. I personally do bear so much grudge against Matsui as he was repented of his crimes, he was most probably held responsible because of the command responsibility law.


Matsui and Asaka marched triumphantly into Nanking on 17 December 1937.
 

General Iwane Matsui 松井石根

Born
July 27, 1878
Aichi prefecture, Japan
Died
December 23, 1948 (aged 70)
Tokyo, Japan
Allegiance
Empire of Japan
Service/branch
Imperial Japanese Army
Years of service
1897–1938
Rank
General
Commands held
11th Division
Taiwan Army of Japan
Shanghai Expeditionary Army
Central China Area Army
Battles/wars
Russo-Japanese War
Russian Civil War
Second Sino-Japanese War
Awards
Order of the Golden Kite, Order of the Rising Sun


Iwane Matsui (松井 石根 Matsui Iwane, extra 27 July 1878 – 23 December 1948) was a general in the Imperial Japanese Army and the commander of the expeditionary forces sent to China in World War II. He was convicted of war crimes and sentenced to death by hanging by the International Military Tribunal for the Far East for responsibility over the Nanking Massacre.


松井石根, Iwane Matsui in October 1932
Early life and education

Matsui was born in Aichi prefecture as the sixth son of a former samurai retainer of the Tokugawa clan of Owari han. Matsui graduated from the 9th class of the Imperial Japanese Army Academy in 1897. His classmates included future Prime Minister Nobuyuki Abe, and generals Sadao Araki, Jinzaburo Mazaki and Shigeru Honjō.


Commanders on the dais of the Nanking Entry Ceremony.
Early military career

Matsui fought in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905, and graduated from the 18th class of the Army Staff College in 1906. He became commanding officer of the 29th Regiment from 1919 to 1921.

From 1921 to 1922, Matsui was attached to the Vladivostok Expeditionary Force Staff for the Japanese Siberian Intervention against Bolshevik Red Army forces in eastern Russia. From 1922 to 1924, he was transferred to military intelligence and made head of the Harbin Special Services Agency in Manchuria. Matsui was then made commanding officer of the IJA 35th Infantry Brigade until 1925. From those posts he was sent to be head of the 2nd Bureau of the Imperial Japanese Army General Staff from 1925 to 1928, then attached to the Army General Staff until 1929 when he was promoted to major general and assigned command of the IJA 11th Division until 1931.

From 1931 to 1932, Matsui was a member of the Japanese delegation to the Geneva Disarmament Conference and then again attached to the Army General Staff until 1933.

Matsui attained the rank of general in 1933, and was appointed a member of the Supreme War Council until 1935, except for the period from 1933 to 1934 when he was Commander in Chief of the Taiwan Army. In 1933 he became one of the initiators of “Greater Asia Association”, and also established a “Taiwan-Asia Association”. He was also awarded the Order of the Rising Sun, 1st class for his career efforts, and went into retirement from active military service in 1935.


The Entry Ceremony into the Nanking Castle by the Japanese forces (Dec. 17, 1937)
 

Four military leaders at the Memorial Ceremony for War Dead at Kukung Airfield: Kiyoshi Hasegawa (Commander-in-chief of 3rd Fleet), Iwane Matsui (Commander of the Central China Area Army), Asakanomiya (Commander of the Shanghai Expeditionary Army), Heisuke Yanagawa (Commander of 10th Army) (18 December 1937)


The message of condolence of the Commander Matsui in memorial service for the brave soldiers killed in the war at an airport close to the Ming Dynasty palace, inside the Zhongshan GateDecember 18, 1937


Dedication of a sacred tree by Commander Matsui at the memorial service of NankingDecember 18, 1937

Second Sino-Japanese War

Command of the Shanghai Expeditionary Force

However, with the start of the Second Sino-Japanese War, Matsui was recalled to duty on 15 August 1937 to become the commander of the Japanese Shanghai Expeditionary Force (SEF) during the Battle of Shanghai. On leaving the Imperial Palace in Tokyo, Matsui remarked to War Minister Hajime Sugiyama that: "There's no solution except to break the power of Chiang Kai-shek by capturing Nanking. That is what I must do."

On 23 August, the SEF arrived in Shanghai, and was reinforced with the Japanese Tenth Army commanded by Lieutenant General Heisuke Yanagawa later in October. On 7 November, Japanese Central China Area Army (CCAA) was organized by combining the SEF and the 10th Army, with Matsui appointed as its commander-in-chief concurrently with that of the SEF. After winning the battles around Shanghai, the SEF suggested the Imperial General Headquarters in Tokyo to attack Nanking. The CCAA was rearranged and Lieutenant General Prince Asaka (Yasuhiko), an uncle of Emperor Hirohito, was appointed as the commander of the SEF, while Matsui stayed as the commander of CCAA overseeing both the SEF and the 10th Army. The real nature of Matsui's authority is however difficult to establish as he was confronted with a member of the imperial family directly appointed by the Emperor. In anticipation of the attack on Nanking, Matsui issued orders to his armies that read:


Nanking is the capital of China and the capture thereof is an international affair; therefore, careful study should be made so as to exhibit the honor and glory of Japan and augment the trust of the Chinese people, and that the battle in the vicinity of Shanghai is aimed at the subjugation of the Chinese Army, therefore protect and patronize Chinese officials and people, as afar as possible; the Army should always bear in mind not to involve foreign residents and armies in trouble and maintain close liaison with foreign authorities in order to avoid misunderstandings.


On 10 December 1937, the SEF began its attack on Nanking, and the Kuomintang forces that remained surrendered on 13 December 1937. The Nanking massacre began immediately afterwards. Matsui and Asaka marched triumphantly into Nanking on 17 December 1937.

While Matsui himself was not present during the beginning of the atrocities (he was ill at the time), he was aware of what his men were doing in the city, as were members of the Japanese foreign service who had followed the army into the city. Word began to trickle out of Nanking, and growing pressure was placed on the Imperial government to recall the SEF's officers.


(l-r) Navy Commander Kiyoshi Hasegawa, Army Commander Iwane Matsui and Lieutenant General Prince Asaka at a memorial service held in Nanking on 18 December 1937


松井石根, Iwane Matsui (PHOTO SOURCE: http://www.generals.dk/general/Matsui/Iwane/Japan.html)
Nanking Massacre

Concerning atrocities in Nanking, Matsui wrote in his war journal about rapes (20 December) and looting (29 December) and wrote it was very much regrettable that these behaviours destroyed the reputation of the Imperial Japanese Army. He also mentioned "a number of abominable incidents within the past 50 days" at the memorial service for the war-dead of the SEF held on 7 February and rebuked, in tears, the officers and the soldiers in the place, saying that atrocities done by a part of the army had damaged the reputation of the empire, such a thing should not happen in the Imperial Army, they should maintain discipline strictly and should never persecute innocent people, and so on.


Koa Kannon
Second retirement

Both Matsui and Asaka were recalled to Japan in 1938. Matsui retired again from the military, and returned to his hometown of Atami, Shizuoka prefecture. Along with several others in the community, he built a large statue of Kannon, the Buddhist Goddess of Mercy, facing in the direction of Nanking.


松井石根, Iwane Matsui in 1945

The defendants at the International Military Tribunal for the Far East Ichigaya Court: Accused Japanese war criminals in the prisoners' box. Front row of defendants from left to right: General Kenji Doihara; Field Marshal Shunroku Hata; Koki Hirota, former prime minister of Japan; General Jiro Minami; General Hideki Tojo, former prime minister of Japan; Takasumi Oka; General Yoshijiro Umezu; General Sadao Araki; General Akira Muto; Naoki Hoshino; Okinori Kaga; Marquis Koichi Kido. Back row: Colonel Kingiro Hashimoto; General Kuniaki Koiso; Admiral Osami Nagano; General Hiroshi Oshima; General Iwane Matsui; Shumei Okawa; Baron Kiichiro Hiranuma; Shigenori Togo; Yosuke Matsuoka; Mamoru Shigemitsu; General Kenryo Sato; Admiral Shigetaro Shimada; Toshio Shiratori; Teiichi Suzuki.
Trial

Arrested by the American occupation authorities after the surrender of Japan, Matsui was charged with war crimes in connection with the actions of the Japanese army in China. In 1948, the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE) found him guilty of class B and C war crimes, and he was hanged that December at Sugamo Prison, alongside six others, including Hideki Tōjō. He was 70 at the time of his death.

Evidence

In court, Muto straightforwardly admitted that what the prosecutors dubbed "the Rape of Nanking" took place. There were many other Japanese witnesses who acknowledged that there were excesses of Japanese troops in Nanking, though their perceptions as to the scale of the atrocities varied.

Among the most candid witnesses was Ishii Itaro, the East Asia Bureau chief of the Foreign Ministry. He testified that he was briefed about the rape, arson, looting, and murders from Foreign Ministry offices in Nanjing and Shanghai. In his autobiography, Ishii wrote that he and Foreign Minister Hirota Koki had warned the Army many times to take action.

Verdict and sentence

In their decision, the Tribunal wrote:


The Tribunal is satisfied that Matsui knew what was happening. He did nothing, or nothing effective to abate these horrors. He did issue orders before the capture of the city enjoining propriety of conduct upon his troops and later he issued further orders to the same purport. These orders were of no effect as is now known, and as he must have known. It was pleaded in his behalf that at this time he was ill. His illness was not sufficient to prevent his conducting the military operations of his command nor to prevent his visiting the City for days while these atrocities were occurring. He was in command of the Army responsible for these happenings. He knew of them. He had the power, as he had the duty, to control his troops and to protect the unfortunate citizens of Nanking. He must be held criminally responsible for his failure to discharge this duty.

 

1948 Press Photo Former Premier Koki Hirota, Gen.Iwane Matsui & Lt.Gen Akira Muto (PHOTO SOURCE: http://www.ebay.com/itm/1948-Press-Photo-Former-Premier-Koki-Hirota-Gen-Iwane-Matsui-Lt-Gen-Akira-Muto-/370688295072)

Historical assessment

In a 2001 survey Japanese historians were harsh in their assessment of Matsui's performance in Nanking. Professor Yutaka Yoshida, for instance, believes that Matsui made six serious mistakes which contributed to the massacre. Firstly, he insisted on advancing on Nanking without proper logistical support which forced his men to rely on plunder. Secondly, he established no policies to protect the safety of Chinese POWs. Thirdly, he permitted an excessively large number of soldiers to enter the city of Nanking. Fourthly, he did not cooperate sufficiently with the International Committee for the Nanking Safety Zone. Fifthly, he insisted that his triumphal entrance into Nanking be held at an early date, a demand which his subordinates responded to by increasing the speed and severity of their mopping up operations. Finally, he spent too much time on political manoeuvring and neglected his duties as commander. Tokushi Kasahara, though not objecting to these points, also argued that "Matsui alone was made into a scapegoat at the Tokyo War Crimes Trials" when in reality many other individuals, including Prince Asaka, were equally to blame.

The first edition of The Rape of Nanking, by Iris Chang, followed the IMTFE's lead in blaming Matsui for the massacre arguing the traditional view that Matsui planned the invasion of Nanking and was Asaka's commanding officer during the Rape. Chang however revised her position in subsequent editions and insisted on the fact that Matsui was sick during the massacre and that Asaka was therefore the officer in charge. James Yin and Shi Young's book of the same title also blames Asaka for the massacre, and portrays Matsui as a helpless figurehead stuck between a prince and an emperor. The truth is a matter of continued debate.


The following texts were excerpted from the judgment of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East. The photographs of Matsui and Hirota were inserted by author.

THE ATTACK ON NANKING 

When MATSUI was appointed Commander of the Shanghai Expeditionary Forces and left Tokyo for the fighting area, he already had thoughts of pushing on to Nanking after the intended capture of Shanghai. He requested five divisions for the Shanghai Expeditionary Force before leaving Tokyo. Actual preparations for the advance upon China's capital were made, for he had previously made a study of the topography in the vicinity of Shanghai and Nanking. On 8 October 1937, MATSUI issued a statement in which he said: 

"The devil-defying sharp bayonets were just on the point of being unsheathed so as to develop their divine influence, and that the mission of the Army was to fulfill all its duties of protecting Japanese residents and interests, and to chastise the Nanking Government and the outrageous Chinese."
As the area of hostilities around Shanghai was likely to expand, MATSUI was appointed Commander in Chief of the Central China Expeditionary Forces. 

MUTO, Akira, was appointed MATSUI'S vice-chief of staff in late November 1937. Approximately one month after the capture of Shanghai, the Japanese Army arrived outside the city of Nanking. MATSUI issued an order to the effect that as Nanking was the capital of China, its capture was an international event and careful studies should be made so as to dazzle China with Japan's military glory. The Japanese demand for surrender was ignored by the Chinese Government. Bombardment started and the city fell on 13 December 1937. The Japanese Army that entered Nanking was a newly formed organization but it was composed of experienced troops. MATSUI made his triumphant entry on 17 December 1937. From 13 December onward, there occurred what has come to be known as the "Rape of Nanking" which will be dealt with in a later phase. On 1 January 1938, a provisional self-governing body was set up, flying the old discarded five colored Chinese flag instead of the Blue Sky and White Sun which is the official national flag of China.

THE RAPE OF NANKING 

As the Central China Expeditionary Force under command of MATSUI approached the city of Nanking in early December 1937, over one-half of its one million inhabitants and all but a few neutrals who remained behind to organize an International Safety Zone, fled from the city. The Chinese Army retreated, leaving approximately 50,000 troops behind to defend the city. As the Japanese forces stormed the South Gate on the night of 12 December 1937, most of the remaining 50,000 troops escaped through the North and West Gates of the city. Nearly all the Chinese soldiers had evacuated the city or had abandoned their arms and uniforms and sought refuge in the International Safety Zone and all resistance had ceased as the Japanese Army entered the city on the morning of 13 December 1937. The Japanese soldiers swarmed over the city and committed various atrocities. According to one of the eyewitnesses they were let loose like a barbarian horde to desecrate the city. It was said by eyewitnesses that the city appeared to have fallen into the hands of the Japanese as captured prey, that it had not merely been taken in organized warfare, and that the members of the victorious Japanese Army had set upon the prize to commit unlimited violence. Individual soldiers and small groups of two or three roamed over the city murdering, raping, looting, and burning. There was no discipline whatever. Many soldiers were drunk. Soldiers went through the streets indiscriminately killing Chinese men, women and children without apparent provocation or excuse until in places the streets and alleys were littered with the bodies of their victims. According to another witness Chinese were hunted like rabbits, everyone seen to move was shot. At least 12,000 non-combatant Chinese men, women and children met their deaths in these indiscriminate killings during the first two or three days of the Japanese occupation of the city. 

There were many cases of rape. Death was a frequent penalty for the slightest resistance on the part of a victim or the members of her family who sought to protect her. Even girls of tender years and old women were raped in large numbers throughout the city, and many cases of abnormal and sadistic behavior in connection with these rapings occurred. Many women were killed after the act and their bodies mutilated. Approximately 20,000 cases of rape occurred within the city during the first month of the occupation. Japanese soldiers took from the people everything they desired. Soldiers were observed to stop unarmed civilians on the road, search them, and finding nothing of value then to shoot them. Very many residential and commercial properties were entered and looted. Looted stocks were carried away in trucks. After looting shops and warehouses, the Japanese soldiers frequently set fire to them. Taiping Road, the most important shopping street, and block after block of the commercial section of the city were destroyed by fire. Soldiers burned the homes of civilians for no apparent reason. Such burning appeared to follow a prescribed pattern after a few days and continued for six weeks. Approximately one-third of the city was thus destroyed. Organized and wholesale murder of male civilians was conducted with the apparent sanction of the commanders on the pretence that Chinese soldiers had removed their uniforms and were mingling with the population. Groups of Chinese civilians were formed, bound with their hands behind their backs, and marched outside the walls of the city where they were killed in groups by machine gun fire and with bayonets. More than 20,000 Chinese men of military age are known to have died in this fashion. The German Government was informed by its representative about "atrocities and criminal act not of an individual but of an entire Army, namely, the Japanese," which Army, later in the Report, was qualified as a "bestial machinery." 

Those outside the city fared little better than those within. Practically the same situation existed in all the communities within 200 li (about 66 miles) of Nanking. The population had fled into the countryside in an attempt to escape from the Japanese soldiers. In places they had grouped themselves into fugitive camps. The Japanese captured many of these camps and visited upon the fugitives treatment similar to that accorded the inhabitants of Nanking. Of the civilians who had fled Nanking over 57,000 were overtaken and interned. These were starved and tortured in captivity until a large number died. Many of the survivors were killed by machine gun fire and by bayoneting. Large parties of Chinese soldiers laid down their arms and surrendered outside Nanking; within 72 hours after their surrender they were killed in groups by machine gun fire along the bank of the Yangtze River. Over 30,000 such prisoners of war were so killed. There was not even a pretence of trial of these prisoners so massacred. Estimates made at a later date indicate that the total number of civilians and prisoners of war murdered in Nanking and its vicinity during the first six weeks of the Japanese occupation was over 200,000. That these estimates are not exaggerated is borne out by the fact that burial societies and other organizations counted more than 155,000 bodies which they buried. They also reported that most of those were bound with their hands tied behind their backs. These figures do not take into account those persons whose bodies were destroyed by burning or by throwing them into the Yangtze River or otherwise disposed of by Japanese. 

Japanese Embassy officials entered the city of Nanking with the advance elements of the Army; and on 14 December an official of the Embassy informed the International Committee for the Nanking Safety Zone that the "Army was determined to make it bad for Nanking, but, that the Embassy officials were going to try to moderate the action." The Embassy officials also informed the members of the Committee that at the time of the occupation of the city no more than 17 military policemen were provided by the Army commanders to maintain order within the city. When it transpired that complaints to the Army officials did not have any result, those Japanese embassy officials suggested to the foreign missionaries that the latter should try and get publicity in Japan, so that the Japanese Government would be forced by public opinion to curb the Army. Dr. Bates testified that the terror was intense for two and one-half to three weeks, and was serious six to seven weeks following the fall of the city. Smythe, the Secretary of the Int. Committee for the Safety Zone, filed two protests a day for the first six weeks. MATSUI, who had remained in a rear area until 17 December, made a triumphal entry into the city on that day and on 18 December held a religious service for the dead, after which he issued a statement in the course of which he said: 

"I extend much sympathy to millions of innocent people in the Kiangpei and Chekiang districts, who suffered the evils of war. Now the flag of the rising sun is floating high over Nanking, and the Imperial Way is shining in the southern parts of the Yangtze-Kiang. The dawn of the renaissance of the East is on the verge of offering itself. On this occasion, I hope for reconsideration of the situation by the 400 million people of China." 

MATSUI remained in the city for nearly a week. MUTO, then a colonel, had joined MATSUI'S Staff on 10 November 1937 and was with MATSUI during the drive on Nanking and participated in the triumphal entry and occupation of the city. Both he and MATSUI admit that they heard of the atrocities being committed in the city during their stay at rear headquarters after the fall of the city. MATSUI admits that he heard that foreign governments were protesting against the commission of these atrocities. No effective action was taken to remedy the situation. Evidence was given before the Tribunal by an eyewitness that while MATSUI was in Nanking on the 19th of December the business section of the city was in flames. On that day the witness counted fourteen fires in the principal business street alone. After the entry of MATSUI and MUTO into the city, the situation did not improve for weeks. 

Members of the Diplomatic Corps and Press and the Japanese Embassy in Nanking sent out reports detailing the atrocities being committed in and around Nanking. The Japanese Minister-at-Large to China, Ito, Nobufumi, was in Shanghai from September 1937 to February 1938. He received reports from the Japanese Embassy in Nanking and from members of the Diplomatic Corps and Press regarding the conduct of the Japanese troops and sent a resume of the reports to the Japanese Foreign Minister, HIROTA. These reports as well as many others giving information of the atrocities committed at Nanking, which were forwarded by members of the Japanese diplomatic officials in China, were forwarded by HIROTA to the War Ministry of which UMEZU was Vice-Minister. They were discussed at Liaison Conferences, which were normally attended by the Prime Minister, War and Navy Ministers, Foreign Minister HIROTA, Finance Minister KAYA, and the Chiefs of the Army and Navy General Staffs. News reports of the atrocities were widespread. MINAMI, who was serving as Governor-General of Korea at the time, admits that he read these reports in the Press. Following these unfavorable reports and the pressure of public opinion aroused in nations all over the world, the Japanese Government recalled MATSUI and approximately 80 of his officers but took no action to punish any of them. MATSUI, after his return to Japan on 5 March 1938, was appointed a Cabinet Councilor and on 29 April 1940 was decorated by the Japanese Government for "meritorious services" in the China War. MATSUI, in explaining his recall, says that he was not replaced by HATA because of the atrocities committed by his troops at Nanking but because he considered his work ended at Nanking and wished to retire from the Army. He was never punished. 

The barbarous behavior of the Japanese Army cannot be excused as the acts of a soldiery which had temporarily gotten out of hand when at last a stubbornly defended position had capitulated - rape, arson and murder continued to be committed on a large scale for at least six weeks after the city had been taken and for at least four weeks after MATSUI and MUTO had entered the city. 

The new Japanese Garrison Commander at Nanking, General Amaya, on 5 February 1938, at the Japanese Embassy in Nanking made a statement to the Foreign diplomatic corps criticizing the attitude of the foreigners who had been sending abroad reports of Japanese atrocities at Nanking and upbraiding them for encouraging anti-Japanese feeling. This statement by Amaya reflected the attitude of the Japanese Military toward foreigners in China, who were hostile to the Japanese policy of waging an unrestrained punitive war against the people of China. 

MATSUI, Iwane 

The accused MATSUI is charged under Counts 1, 27, 29, 31, 32, 35, 36, 54 and 55. 

MATSUI was a senior Officer in the Japanese Army and attained the rank of General in 1933. He had a wide experience in the Army, including service in the Kwantung Army and in the General Staff. Although his close association with those who conceived and carried out the conspiracy suggests that he must have been aware of the purposes and policies of the conspirators, the evidence before the Tribunal does not justify a finding that he was a conspirator. 

His military service in China in 1937 and 1938 cannot be regarded, of itself, as the waging of an aggressive war. To justify a conviction under Count 27 it was the duty of the prosecution to tender evidence which would justify an inference that he had knowledge of the criminal character of that war. This has not been done. 

In 1935 MATSUI was placed on the retired list but in 1937 he was recalled to active duty to command the Shanghai Expeditionary Force. He was then appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Central China Area Army, which included the Shanghai Expeditionary Force and the Tenth Army. With these troops he captured the city of Nanking on 13th December 1937. 

Before the fall of Nanking the Chinese forces withdrew and the occupation was of a defenseless city. Then followed a long succession of most horrible atrocities committed by the Japanese Army upon the helpless citizens. Wholesale massacres, individual murders, rape, looting and arson were committed by Japanese soldiers. Although the extent of the atrocities was denied by Japanese witnesses the contrary evidence of neutral witnesses of different nationalities and undoubted responsibility is overwhelming. This orgy of crime started with the capture of the City on the 13th December 1937 and did not cease until early in February 1938. In this period of six or seven weeks thousands of women were raped, upwards of 100,000 people were killed and untold property was stolen and burned. At the height of these dreadful happenings, on 17 December, MATSUI made a triumphal entry into the City and remained there from five to seven days. From his own observations and from the reports of his staff he must have been aware of what was happening. He admits he was told of some degree of misbehavior of his Army by the Kempeitai and by Consular Officials. Daily reports of these atrocities were made to Japanese diplomatic representatives in Nanking who, in turn, reported them to Tokyo. 

The Tribunal is satisfied that MATSUI knew what was happening. He did nothing, or nothing effective to abate these horrors. He did issue orders before the capture of the City enjoining propriety of conduct upon his troops and later he issued further orders to the same purport. These orders were of no effect as is now known, and as he must have known. It was pleaded in his behalf that at this time he was ill. His illness was not sufficient to prevent his conducting the military operations of his command nor to prevent his visiting the City for days while these atrocities were occurring. He was in command of the Army responsible for these happenings. He knew of them. He had the power, as he had the duty, to control his troops and to protect the unfortunate citizens of Nanking. He must be held criminally responsible for his failure to discharge this duty. 

The Tribunal holds the accused MATSUI guilty under Count 55, and not guilty under Counts l, 27, 29, 31, 32, 35, 36 and 54. 

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